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CHARITABLE RATINGS AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALllY: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE HUMAN SERVICE SECTOR 
Qianhua Ling and Daniel Gordon Neely* 
ABSTRACT. Prior research has shown that many donors utilize charity 
ratings for decisions and they give more to higher rated charities. Because 
ratings are partly or completely based on financial information, the financial 
reporting quality of highly rated charities is more critical to donors than that 
of the poorly rated ones. In this study, we examine whether the financial 
reporting quality of charities systematically varies with charitable ratings. 
Examining a sample of human service charities. we find that highly rated 
organizations are more likely to underreport fundraising expenses and 
overstate program ratios. Highly rated organizations appear to be exercising 
accounting discretion to achieve this desirable outcome. Collectively. our 
findings suggest that stakeholders should be cautious when they use the 
rating information. 
INTRODUCTION 
The number of nonprofit charitable organizations exempt from 
income tax has increased substantially in recent times. The 
information returns filed by these organizations rose from 207.272 in 
1998 to 315.184 in 2008,1 In this environment. nonprofits face an 
increasingly competitive market for charitable contributions. Similarly. 
donors have an increasingly difficult task in selecting appropriate 
nonprofit recipients. As the number of choices goes uP. donors 
increase their demand for financial information {Gordon & 
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Khumawala, 1999). They are also more likely to rely on charity rating 
information for their decisions. Prior studies find that charitable 
ratings affect public contributions. Donors give more to highly rated 
organizations (Tinkelman, 1998; Sloan, 2009; Gordon et aI., 2009). 
Because ratings are partly or completely based on financial 
information, the financial reporting quality of highly rated charities is 
more critical to donors than that of the poorly rated charities. In this 
study, we examine whether the financial reporting quality of 
non profits systematically varies with charity ratings. 
The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 requires nonprofits in the U.S. to 
provide their financial information to the public via Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income 
Tax. Nonprofits are required to file Form 990 annually and they 
provide a large amount of information on the Form. Rating agencies 
faCilitate the processing of the information which intends to help 
stakeholders make informed decisions. Ratings provided by these 
information intermediaries generate at least three advantages. First, 
ratings greatly reduce the information processing cost for 
stakeholders by providing concise ratings. For example, The American 
Institute of Philanthropy (AlP) gives top performers a letter grade "A," 
followed by "B," "C," and "D." It assigns an "F" to organizations with 
the least satisfactory performance. The Better Business Bureau's 
Wise Giving Alliance (BBB) has only two categories for the nonprofits. 
A nonprofit organization either "meets" or "does not meet" the BBB 
standards. The Charity Navigator summarizes its evaluation using a 
number of stars, zero, one, two, three, or four stars. The zero-star 
nonprofits are the least favorable and the four-star nonprofits are the 
most desirable. 
Second, these rating systems promote sustainable practice. 
Judging charities based solely on the percentage of expenditures on 
charitable purposes and fundraising is not theoretically sound 
(Bhattacharya & Tinkelman, 2009). Rating systems go beyond these 
two measures and try to neutralize this issue. For example, the BBB 
standards cover not only financial performance but also governance, 
oversight and measuring effectiveness. Charity Navigator analyzes 
charity performance in seven areas.2 
Finally, the ratings incorporate the institutional knowledge of the 
rating agencies. For evaluation purpose, the BBB requires 
organizations to submit their budgets which allow the agency to 
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analyze this privately available information (bbb.org). Charity 
Navigator varies its scoring criteria by sector (charitynavigator.org). 
For example, food banks operate with fewer administration activities 
than other charities. The cut-off point of the administrative expense 
ratio is much lower for these organizations to score a high rating. 
Prior studies find a strong association between ratings and 
donations (Tinkelman, 1998; Sloan, 2009; Gordon et aI., 2009). 
Tinkelman (1998) finds that non-individual donors respond negatively 
to unfavorable ratings, while Sloan (2009) reports that donors react 
to positive ratings only. Gordon et al. (2009) document a positive 
association between rating change and the change in contribution. 
These ratings rely heavily on financial information for assessment. For 
example, Charity Navigator, BBB, and AlP all evaluate an 
organization's program ratio. Because financial information can be 
misreported (e.g., Krishnan et aI., 2006; Jones & Roberts, 2006), it is 
important to examine whether highly rated charities are more likely to 
misreport their financial information. 
In this study, we examine a hand-collected sample of human 
service organizations rated by Charity Navigator. Charity Navigator 
covers more charities than any other rating agencies. Its ratings range 
from zero to four stars with four-stars indicating top performance. A 
list of four-star charities is prominently displayed on the rating 
agency's website. The link to the list is posted on the top part of every 
webpage. Our analyses show that highly rated organizations are more 
likely to underreport fundraising expenses and overstate program 
ratios. We also find that these highly rated organizations tend not to 
engage in obvious misreporting practices such as zero fundraising 
expenses, zero executive compensation, or using joint costs to inflate 
program expenses. It appears that it is the generous allocation of 
expenses to the program category that contributes to the low 
fundraising expenses and high program ratios. 
Our study contributes to the rating literature in two distinct ways. 
First, while prior studies examine the impact of ratings on donor 
decisions (Tinkelman, 1998; Sloan, 2009; Gordon et aI., 2009), our 
study is the first to show rated non profits likely consider the rating 
implication in utilizing their financial reporting discretion. Our findings 
indicate that highly rated organizations present a higher degree of 
underreported fundraising expense and overstated program ratios. 
Second, we add to the literature by demonstrating that inflating 
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program ratios may not be done in an extreme way such as reporting 
zero fund raising expense; rather, it may be done in a subtle way. For 
example, Keating et a1. (2008) find that nonprofits may report smaller 
amounts of telemarketing expenses as fundraising expense than the 
amounts actually incurred. We provide some evidence that inflated 
program ratios may be because of the generous allocations of 
employee wages and benefits, and joint costs to the program expense 
category. 
Collectively, our findings suggest that stakeholders should 
exercise judgment when they use the rating information. 
Stakeholders should not base their decisions solely on the ratings 
because nonprofits may use discretion in assigning expenses to 
different categories to show better performance. The findings from 
this study should stir debate about whether rating agencies 
contribute to creating an efficient philanthropic market or are 
unintentionally driving improper use of discretion in financial 
reporting practice. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss 
related prior literature first and then present our hypothesis which 
links ratings and reporting quality. Following that we report the 
measures of financial quality, sample selection, and findings. We 
provide a conclusion section at the end of the paper. 
RELATED PRIOR RESEARCH 
Prior research suggests that donors care about how effectively 
and efficiently non profits use donations. It is a challenge to measure 
effectiveness because effectiveness is difficult to quantify and 
non profits provide only limited disclosures in this regard (Parsons, 
2003). However, financial information can be used to calculate 
efficiency measures. Financial information is widely available since 
charities were required to provide their Form 990s to the public in 
1996 (Gordon et aI., 1999). Research suggests that donors respond 
to summary financial measures. One widely used summary financial 
measure is the program ratio, the percentage of total expenses 
devoted to the mission of the charity. From the donors' perspective, 
the program ratio is the inverse of their uprice" to upurchase" a dollar 
of service for the beneficiaries of charitable efforts. The higher the 
program ratio, the lower the donor purchase price. An early study by 
Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) find a negative relation between 
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total donations and donor purchase price. Later studies such as 
Tinkelman (1999) also find a significantly negative relation between 
total direct contributions and donor purchase price. Research 
studying the phenomena in the United Kingdom (Posnett & Sandler, 
1989), Canada (Callen, 1994), and Singapore (Wong et aI., 1998) 
reports similar findings. These studies suggest that donors reward 
efficient charities. 
Another summary financial measure is the portion of expense 
spent on the administrative function. Low spending on administration 
leaves more funds for communicating and fulfilling the mission of the 
nonprofit. Greenlee and Brown (1999) define the administrative ratio 
as the portion of the total expense spent on administrative and 
program activities. They find that the ratio is negatively associates 
with total contributions. Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007) point out 
that some prior studies may contain observations with unreliable 
administrative ratios. They therefore restrict their samples to 
nonprofits that spend more than $1,000 on fund raising and 
administrative functions, have been established for four or more 
years, have received more than $100,000 in donations in the prior 
year, and whose donation is at least ten percent of prior year total 
revenue. Their findings generally support a significant negative 
association between the accounting measures of administrative 
efficiency and donations. 
Watchdog groups publish ratings, aimed at helping donors choose 
nonprofit organizations. Tinkelman (1998) examines whether 
donations are lower if a nonprofit violates the standards set by the 
National Charities Information Bureau (NCIB) or the Council of Better 
Business Bureaus (CBBB). He finds that non-individual donors 
respond negatively to a violation of standards established by these 
agencies. Sloan (2009) studies the effect of the rating from the 
Better Business Bureau's Wise Giving Alliance on the amount of 
public support, grants, and dues received by nonprofits. She finds 
that a pass rating by the Alliance has a significantly positive effect. 
Using more recent data, Gordon et al. (2009) investigate the relation 
between the change in the Charity Navigator rating and the change in 
contributions. They report that contributions change with the change 
in the rating. The ratings in Tinkelman (1998) and Sloan (2009) 
evaluate a nonprofit's financial performance and governance practice, 
whereas the ratings in Gordon et al. (2009) evaluate financial 
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performance based on information reported on Form 990s. Overall, 
donors prefer nonprofits with higher ratings and support these 
organizations with their scarce resources. 
The above studies provide evidence that stakeholders rely on 
financial information for decision making. This may provide nonprofits 
with incentives to manage financial reporting. In addition, Form 990s 
are generally not required to be audited (Yetman & Yetman, 2012) 
and the probability that the Form will be audited by the IRS is low 
(GAO, 2002). Misreporting is therefore possible. Indeed, some studies 
indicate that misreporting exists and the primary purpose is to inflate 
the program expense ratio (e.g., Trussel, 2003; Wing et aI., 2006; 
Krishnan et aI., 2006; Jones & Roberts, 2006; Tinkelman, 2009). For 
example, Krishnan et al. (2006) report that many non profits engage 
in fundraising activities but fail to report fundraising expense or report 
smaller than actual amounts. The possibility of this misreporting 
increases with the sensitivity of executive compensation and 
donation to program ratios. Unique to nonprofits, if an activity serves 
a public education purpose and a fund raising appeal simultaneously, 
non profits can allocate the cost of this activity (Le., joint costs) among 
program expense, fundraising expense, and administrative expense. 
Jones and Roberts (2006) find that non profits use both the level of 
joint costs and the share of joint costs allocated to programs to avoid 
reporting changes in program ratios. Keating et al. (2008) document 
that some non profits inappropriately net telemarketing expenses 
against revenue or understate the amount that should be reported as 
fundraising expense; in doing so, nonprofits report lower fundraising 
ratios and thus higher program ratios. In a recent case study, 
Tinkelman (2009) details how the Avon Foundation managed their 
reporting to meet rating agency guidelines. Specifically, prior to 2003 
the Avon Foundation reported all special event expenses associated 
with a major fundraising event as fundraising expenses. However, 
from 2003 to 2006, large amounts of event expenses were 
unreasonably assigned to programs. This change in reporting enabled 
the Avon Foundation to meet the 2003 BBB guidelines. 
RATING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
We examine the human service charities rated by Charity 
Navigator. Charity Navigator was founded in 2001. It is the largest 
nonprofit rating agency in the U.S. Charity Navigator evaluates over 
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5,000 charities. Its rating information is free to the public and the 
website enables easy comparison of ratings across charities and over 
time. Stakeholders appear to increasingly rely on Charity Navigator 
ratings as over five million visits to the website occurred in 2011 and 
four million in 2007 (charitynavigator.org; Gordon et aI., 2009). 
Analyzing Charity Navigator ratings, Gordon et al. (2009) show that 
changes in ratings are positively associated with changes and levels 
of contributions. Together with other studies (Tinkelman, 1998; Sloan, 
2009), Gordon et al. (2009) provide evidence that higher ratings 
mean more donations. 
The primary purpose of human service charities is to provide 
direct support to people in need such as the disadvantaged, the 
elderly, and the disabled. Gordon and Khumawala (1999) suggest 
that donors who are not direct beneficiaries of the charitable work are 
more likely to seek financial information than those who are. 
Following this theory, since donors of human service organizations 
are generally not direct beneficiaries of the charitable services, they 
are more likely to do comparison shopping. As a consequence, 
human service organizations may have strong incentives to report 
high financial performance and thus higher ratings. If misreporting 
prevails, one would expect that highly rated charities are likely to 
have poor reporting quality. 
Alternatively, highly rated charities may be truly high quality 
organizations. The non-distribution nature of non profits likely limits 
the extent of self-serving management activity (Hansmann, 1980; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983). Further, managers in nonprofits self-select 
into the sector. They are more driven by altruism and less by financial 
gains. To these managers, providing charitable services is a top 
priority and they try to minimize perquisites and fundraising activities 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1987). Managers of nonprofits may also have high 
ethical standards. Yetman (2001) reports that charities do not 
allocate expenses from tax-exempt categories to taxable categories to 
reduce tax liabilities. All these factors contribute to high operational 
performance and the performance is faithfully represented by the 
financial measures used to rate the charities. 
In summary, the performance hypothesis argues for a positive 
association whereas the misreporting hypothesis argues for a 
negative association between ratings and reporting quality. Absent 
theories regarding the relative strength of these arguments, we do 
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not take an a priori stand on which is more likely to dominate. Instead, 
we consider the association between ratings and reporting quality an 
empirical issue. Accordingly, we state the hypothesis in null form: 
there is no systematic reporting quality difference across ratings. 
MEASURES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING QUALITY 
Prior research suggests that in the nonprofit world the objective of 
an organization is not to maximize profit but to maximize charitable 
output. Partly because the quality of the output is difficult to measure, 
the focus is placed on the reported charitable spending (Parsons, 
2003; Trussel, 2003). As donors and watchdog groups all show 
special interest in this spending, nonprofits have incentives to inflate 
reported program expenses. This may be done by underreporting 
fundraising and/or administrative expenses and thus overstating 
program spending (e.g. Trussel, 2003; Krishnan et aI., 2006; Jones & 
Roberts, 2006; Keating et aI., 2008; Tinkelman, 2009) . 
We adopt three proxies for reporting quality. Our first measure 
relates to fundraising expenses. Nonprofits engage in various kinds of 
activities to raise funds. Higher fundraising expenses may not 
necessarily lead to higher contributions, but higher contributions 
(public support, indirect public support, and government grants) are 
very likely to be the result of higher fundraising expenses. Based on 
the discussion of the theoretical link between donations and 
fundraising expenses by Steinberg (1.986), Yetman and Yetman 
(2012) develop a fundraising expense expectation model. To test 
whether charities understate their fundraising expenses, we estimate 
this expectation model. The residuals from the model are used as an 
indicator of reporting quality. A negative residual indicates that an 
organization reports less fundraising expenses than the model 
predicts. The lower the value, the higher the amount underreported. 
The fundraising expectation model is specified as:3 
Fundraising ExpenSeSIt-1 = (30 + (31 Direct Public SUPportit 
+ f32 Indirect Public Supportit + (33 Government Grantsit 
+ YkYear Indicatorsit + ()j Group Indica torsi/ + Ci (1) 
Similarly, to test whether administrative expenses are 
underreported. we estimate an administrative expense model. In 
addition to the contributions variables, this model includes Total 
Expenses, Total Assets, and the square of Total Assets. This reflects 
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the fact that large organizations incur higher administrative expenses 
than smaller organizations and that administrative expenses increase 
at a diminishing rate. Following Yetman and Yetman (2012), the 
model is specified as: 
Administrative Expensesit·~ = (30 + (3~ Direct Public SUPporti! 
+ {32 Indirect Public SUPporti! + (33 Government Grantsi! 
+ {34 Total ExpenseSit+ (35 Total Assetsit+ (36 Total 
Assets2 it + YkYear Indicatorsit + OJ Group Indicatorsit + Ei 
(2) 
The residuals of this model are another indicator of reporting quality. 
The lower the value, the higher the amount underreported. We use 
the administrative expense residuals as our second measure of 
reporting quality. 
Unlike the two measures above that indirectly suggest whether an 
organization inflates its program expenses or not, our last measure 
directly examines the program ratio. Building on Baber et al. (2001), 
the expected program ratio is a function of the organization's size, its 
strategy, and fundraising spending. The program ratio will be higher 
for larger organizations, lower for organizations approaching small 
donations, and lower for organizations spending more on fundraising. 
Trussel (2003) posits that organizations with standardized residuals 
significantly greater than zero at the 10% level (one-tailed) are very 
likely to overstate the program ratio, thus, they are potential 
accounting manipulators. The program ratio expectation model is: 
Program Expensei! / Total Expensei! = {30 + {3~ Ln (Total Revenueit) 
+ {32 (Professional Fundraising Expenseit / Total 
Expenseit) + (33 (Total Fundraising Expenseit / Total 
Contributionsit) + OJ Group Indicatorslt + Ei 
(3) 
The performance hypothesis predicts that the fundraising 
expense residuals and the administrative expense residuals would be 
higher (more positive) for the highly rated organizations, and that 
there would be fewer potential accounting manipulators in the highly 
rated groups. The opposite is expected by the misreporting 
hypothesis. The highly rated organizations would show lower (more 
negative) fundraising expense residuals and/or administrative 
expense residuals, and there would be more potential accounting 
manipulators in the highly rated groups. 
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SAMPLE 
Our rating information for the human service organizations was 
collected from Charity Navigator in 2008. We start with 2,680 charity-
year observations. We lose 38 observations during the matching 
process with the Guidestar financial information. We exclude 10 more 
observations because of a change in the fiscal year. Our final sample 
includes 2,632 charity-year observations. This sample selection 
process is presented in Table 1. 
Charity Navigator ratings 
TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
Less: no financial information in Guidestar 
Less: fiscal year change 
Final sample 
FINDINGS 
N 
2,680 
38 
10 
2,632 
We first establish whether organizations are likely to report their 
numbers inaccurately by comparing the fundraising residual, 
administrative expense residual, and program ratio residual from the 
previously discussed models (1), (2), and (3). All three models have a 
high explanatory power, 80%, · 97%, and 65% respectively, with a 
mean residual of zero. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of 
these residuals and the percentage of potential accounting 
manipulators by rating group. The four-star group has negative means 
and medians for fund raising residuals and administrative residuals. 
The three-star group also has a negative mean and median for 
fundraising residuals. Its administrative residuals have a negative 
median, but a positive mean. The means of fundraising and 
administrative residuals are positive for lower-rated groups. The 
program ratio residuals are greater for the highly-rated groups than 
the lower-rated groups. The percentage of possible accounting 
manipulators decreases with the ratings. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Residuals of Expectation Models and 
Potential Accounting Manipulators 
Variable 4-Star 3-Star 2-Star 1-Star O-Star 
FundResid Mean -287 -23 110 317 1,643 
Median -108 -55 30 105 1,080 
AdminResid Mean -51 7 13 138 -196 
Median -95 -80 -85 -36 -233 
ProgRatioResid Mean 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 
Median 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 
ManageProgRatio Mean 0.51 0.42 0.38 0.23 0.13 
Sample Size 748 945 632 252 55 
Note: This table represents descriptive statistics for the sample based 
on Charity Navigator Ratings. FundResid = The residual (in 
$000) from the fundraising expense expectation model (1); 
AdminResid = The residual (in $000) from the administrative 
expense expectation model (2); ProgRatioResid - The 
standardized residual from the program expense expectation 
model (3); ManageProgRatio - 1 if the standardized 
ProgRatioResid is positive and statistically greater than zero at 
the 99% confidence level. 
Table 3 presents statistical tests of differences between the 
mean residuals across rating groups. The statistical tests support the 
pattern we observe from Table 2 that highly rated organizations are 
more likely to understate fundraising expenses and overstate 
program expenses, resulting in higher program expense ratio 
residuals for highly rated non profits. Specifically, four- and three-star 
organizations understate their fundraising expenses relative to zero-, 
one-, or two-star organizations. The differences in administrative 
expenses are not statistically significant in many cases, and do not 
provide conclusive evidence of over- or under-stating. Because of high 
program ratio residuals, there are more potential accounting 
manipulators in the highly rated groups than in the lower rated groups. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that highly rated organizations 
overstate their program expenses and understate their fundraising 
expenses. 
80 LING &' NEELY 
TABLE 3 
Test of Differences between the Star Ratings 
14-3 14-2 14-1 14-0 3-2 3-1 13-0 2-1 2-0 1-0 
FResid 264 397 604 1,930 133 340 1,666 207 1,533 1,326 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
AResid 58 65 189 144 7 131 202 124 209 1333 
** *** *** *** *** 
PResid .02 .03 .05 10 .01 .03 .08 .02 .07 .05 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** 
ManPR .09 .13 28 38 .04 .19 .29 .15 .25 .10 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** * 
Note: The table represents the average difference in the variables for 
different star comparisons. ***, **, * statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The z-statistic is the reported 
test statistic for test of differences. FResid = The residual (in 
$000) from the fundraising expense expectation model; AResid 
= The residual (in $000) from the administrative expense 
expectation model; PResid = The standardized residual from 
the program expense expectation model; ManPR = 1 if the 
standardized PResid is positive and statistically greater than 
zero at the 99% confidence level. 
While the preceding analyses support the notion that higher rated 
nonprofits overstate program expenses and understate fund raising 
expenses, it is not clear that these results hold after controlling for 
factors known to be associated with misreporting. Table 4 provides 
descriptive statistics by rating of measures found by Yetman and 
Yetman (2012) to be associated with misreporting of overhead 
expenses. These control variables are available for 1,151 
observations. Four-star organizations tend to be younger than lower 
rated organizations, more likely to receive an A-133 audit, have more 
assets, and more likely to have outstanding tax exempt bonds. 
Table 5 presents the multivariate results with the residuals from 
the three expectation models representing the dependent variable 
respectively. Along with control variables, an independent variable is 
included for the overall rating of an organization. In addition, separate 
models are run with the independent variable of ratings replaced by a 
dichotomous variable for whether an organization is four-star rated or 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables by Rating 
Overall Rating - 0 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Donor Restriction 15 0.04 0.16 -0.11 0.61 
Outside Accountant 15 0.47 0.52 0.00 1.00 
Age 15 16.93 11.62 5.00 47.00 
Audit A·133 15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Current Ratio 15 22.76 49.03 0.00 186.38 
Total Assets 15 1,466 2.061 6 7.711 
Municipal Bonds 15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Voting Directors 15 6.67 4.45 0.00 14.00 
Overall Rating - 1 
Variable Obs Mean Std. D!;lv. Min Max 
Donor Restriction 102 0.25 0.31 0.00 1.24 
Outside Accountant 102 0.58 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age 102 37.16 17.63 6.00 73.00 
Audit A-133 102 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Current Ratio 102 27.10 126.81 0.00 1.236.34 
Total Assets 102 10.600 22,600 64 146,000 
Municipal Bonds 102 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Voting Directors 102 16.32 13.12 0.00 108.00 
Overall Rating - 2 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Donor Restriction 262 0.26 0.27 0.00 1.87 
Outside Accountant 262 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age 262 37.57 40.13 4.00 611.00 
Audit A-133 262 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Current Ratio 262 68.95 847.07 0.00 13,710.44 
Total Assets 262 24.000 91.200 355 870.000 
Municipal Bonds 262 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Voting Directors 262 20.51 16.84 0.00 132.00 
Overall Rating - 3 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Donor Restriction 420 0.31 1.28 -0.28 26.06 
Outside Accountant 420 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Age 420 34.05 18.82 5.00 84.00 
Audit A-133 420 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Current Ratio 420 9.36 67.48 -1.231.21 448.63 
Total Assets 420 23,400 50.300 191 352.000 
Municipal Bonds 420 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Voting Directors 420 24.78 31.02 0.00 474.00 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Overall Rating = 3 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Donor Restriction 420 0.31 1.28 -0.28 26.06 
Outside Accountant 420 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Age 420 34.05 18.82 5.00 84.00 
Audit A-133 420 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Current Ratio 420 9.36 67.48 -1,231.21 448.63 
Total Assets 420 23.400 50,300 191 352,000 
Municipal Bonds 420 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Voting Directors 420 24.78 31.02 0.00 474.00 
Overall Rating - 4 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Donor Restriction 352 0.26 0.26 -0.09 1.14 
Outside Accountant 352 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Age 352 31.22 18.86 4.00 87.00 
Audit A-133 352 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Current Ratio 352 21.80 76.40 0.06 1,300.26 
Total Assets 352 35,300 247,000 96 4,510,000 
Municipal Bonds 352 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Voting Directors 352 23.62 18.29 0.00 159.00 
Note: The total number of observations drops from 2,632 to 1,151 due to 
missing observations for the control variables. The variables are defined 
as follows: Donor Restriction = Restricted Net Assets / Total Net Assets; 
Outside Accountant = 1 if reported accounting fees is greater than zero; 
Age = the age of the organization measured by subtracting the current 
year from the ruling year; Audit A-133 = 1 if the organization reports 
greater than $500.000 in government grants; Current Ratio = (cash + 
savings + securities investments) / (total liabilities - mortgage payable -
tax exempt bonds); Total Assets = total end of year assets (in $000); 
Municipal Bonds = 1 if the organization reports tax exempt bonds; 
Voting Directors = the number of voting board members. 
not. The regression results are consistent with the previously 
discussed univariate results. Specifically, the coefficients on both the 
overall rating and the four-star rating variables are positive and 
statistically significant for the residual program ratio model, negative 
for the residual fundraising expense model. and not significant for the 
residual administrative expense model. These results suggest that 
after controlling for other known factors associated with misreporting 
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overhead costs, higher rated organizations are more apt to overstate 
their program expenses and understate their fundraising expenses. 
TABLE 5 
Regression Results for Program Ratio, Fundraislng Expense, and 
Administrative Expense Residuals 
Residual Residual Residual Residual reSidual Residual 
Program Program Fundraising Fundraising ~dmin Admin 
Ratio Ratio Expense Expense ~pense Expense 
Overall .02*** -255.98*** 54.15 
Rating (5.34) (-4.10) -0.90) 
Four Star .02*** -403.72*** 85.81. 
(4.92) (-2.84) (-1.07) 
Donor .00 .00 -16.97 -23.31 143 .64 ** 42.29** 
Restriction (-1.43) (-1.26) (-0.73) (-0.97) 2.28) (2.15) 
Outside -.01. -.01 127.72 111.93 144.31. 140.97 
Accountant (-1.1. 7) (-0.97) (1.17) (1.03) 1.47) (1.47) 
Age .00 .00 2.12 2.38 12.88 2.93 
(-0.9) (-1.07) (1.14) (1.31) 1.62) (1.58) 
AuditA-133 -.02*** -.01*** -380.10*** -415.7*** 5.00 12.48 
(-3.49) (-2.81) (-2.88) (-3.08) -0.06) (-0.16) 
Current .00 .00 -.05*** -.04*** .03 ... 02 
RatiO (-0.7) (-1.05) (-4.38) (-3.36) -1.4) (-1.39) 
Total Assets .00 .00 .00 .00 00*** .00*** 
(-1.16) (-1.22) (-1.56) (-1.57) -2.81) (-2.82) 
Municipal -.02** -.01* -516.71* -543.47* 944.38** 938.75** 
Bonds (-2.16) (-1.92) (-1.68) (-1.75) 2 .28) (2.26) 
Voting .00** .00*** -.64 -1.97 2.97 3 .25 
Directors (2.38) (2.82) (-0.2) (-0.61) -0_8) (-0.88) 
Voting .00*** .00*** .00 .01 01 .01 
Directors2 (-3.37) (-3.65) (0.64) (0.91) 0 .96) (1.01) 
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control 
N 1.151 1.151 1,1.51 1,151 1.151 1,151 
R-Square 9% 7% 16% 15% 10% 10% 
Note: Coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) are presented. 
Control variables are previously defined in Table 4. All models include 
controls for state of location and standard errors clustered by EIN. 
Overall Rating = the star rating received by an organization (i.e. 0-4); 
Four Star = 1 if an organization is rated four stars. Significance tests are 
two-tailed. *. **, *** represent significance levels of 10 percent, 5 
percent anC1 1 percent respectively. 
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To understand how highly rated nonprofits misstate their 
expenses, we further examine three obvious misreporting practices. 
First, consistent with prior literature that finds organizations 
understate fundraising expenses, we measure whether organizations 
receive direct public support but report zero fund raising expenses 
(Krishnan et al.. 2006; Yetman & Yetman, 2012). Our second 
measure tests whether organizations report zero officer 
compensation. Nonprofits have been scrutinized in recent years for 
paying their officers excessive compensation. Failure to report officer 
compensation on Form 990 is indicative of an organization not being 
transparent in compensation reporting and has been utilized in prior 
literature as a measure of reporting quality (Neely, 2011). Finally. we 
measure whether organizations report joint costs. Prior literature 
finds that organizations utilize joint cost allocations to smooth their 
program expense ratio (Jones & Roberts, 2006). 
As Table 6 shows, the program expense ratio increases with the 
ratings. This is not surprising because one of the variables utilized in 
Charity Navigator's rating scheme is the program expense ratio. 
However, the descriptive statistics show that four-star organizations, 
the highest rated group, report fewer incidences of zero executive 
compensation, joint cost allocations, or zero fund raising. The three-
star group also reports fewer incidences of joint cost allocations. Its 
reporting of zero compensation and zero fundraising are comparable 
to those of the lower rated groups. The tests of differences in Table 7 
suggest that statistically the likelihood of reporting zero 
compensation or zero fundraising is not different between highly 
rated groups and lower rated groups. The reporting of joint costs is 
less likely in the highly rated groups. 
While the three measures of obvious misreporting do not support 
the finding that highly rated non profits are more likely to misstate 
their financials, a closer look at their expense allocations suggests 
how they are able to accomplish a higher program expense ratio. We 
checked the labor related expenses of the sample. On average, 
non profits spend 38% of total expenses on officer compensation and 
other employee wages and benefits. Also reported in Table 6, the 
percentages of wages, benefits, and joint costs allocated to program 
expense (compared to fundraising or administrative expense) are all 
higher for highly rated non profits. Given the discretion involved in 
" --- "- -----
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TABLE 6 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Interest 
Variable 4-Star 3-Star 2-Star 1-Star O-Star 
ProgExpRatio Mean 0.87 0.83 0.79 0.68 0.22 
Median 0.87 0.83 0.80 0.70 0.15 
ZeroComp Mean 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.15 
JointCost Mean 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.25 0.35 
ZeroFundR Mean 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Com pRate Mean 0.53 0.54 0 .53 0 .55 0.51 
Median 0.64 0.64 0.56 0.60 0.51 
WageRate Mean 0 .81 0.80 0.77 0.73 0.42 
Median 0.84 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.33 
BenefitsRate Mean 0.80 0.79 0.75 0.70 0.42 
Median 0.82 0.81 0.79 0.74 0.38 
JointRate Mean 0.73 0.65 0 .63 0.51 0.22 
Median 0.82 0.72 0.69 0.50 0.17 
Sample Size 748 945 632 252 55 
Note: This table represents descriptive statistics for the sample based on 
their Charity Navigator Rating. 
ProgExpRatio = Program Expenses / Total Expenses; ZeroComp = 1. if 
officer compensation is zero or missing; JointCost = 1. if the organization 
reports having joint costs; ZeroFundR = 1. if the organization reports 
direct public support and zero fund raising expenses; Com pRate = The 
percentage of officer compensation allocated to programs; WageRate = 
The percentage employee wages (other than officers) allocated to 
programs; BenefitsRate = the percentage of employee benefits 
allocated to programs; JointRate = the percentage of total joint costs 
allocated to programs. 
making these expense allocations, it is probable that generous 
expense allocations to programs are responsible for some of the 
reported performance differential between highly rated non profits 
and lower rated non profits. Statistical tests in Table 7 confirm that 
the expense allocation to programs is more generous in highly rated 
nonprofits compared to their lower rated peers. Specifically, four- and 
three-star organizations allocate a greater percentage of wages, 
benefits, and joint costs to programs relative to zero- to two-star 
orca n izations. 
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TABLE 7 
Test of Differences between the Star Ratings 
Variable 4-3 4 -2 4 -1 4-0 3 -2 3-1 3 -0 2 -1 2 -0 1-0 
ProgExp .04 .08 .19 .65 .04 .15 .61 .11 .57 .46 
Ratio *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Zero -.03 -.03 -.02 -.06 .00 .01 -.03 .01 -.03 -.04 
Comp 
Joint -.01 -.05 -.16 -.26 -.04 -.15 -.25 -.09 -.21 -.10 
Cost ** *** *** ** *** *** *** *** 
Zero -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02 .00 .00 -.01 .00 -.01 -.01 
FundR * 
Comp -.01 .00 -.02 .02 .01 -.01 .03 -.02 .02 .04 
Rate 
Wage .01 .04 .08 .39 .03 .07 .38 .04 .35 .31 
Rate * *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Benefits .01 .05 .10 .38 .04 .09 .37 .05 .33 .28 
Rate * *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Joint .08 .10 .22 .51 .02 .14 .43 .12 .41 .29 
Rate ** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Note: This table represents the average difference in the variables of interest 
for different star comparisons. * **, **, and * statistically significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The z-statistic is the reported 
test statistic for test of differences. ProgExpRatio = Program 
Expenses I Total Expenses; ZeroComp = 1 if officer compensation is 
zero or missing; JointCost = 1 if the organization reports having joint 
costs; ZeroFundR = 1 if the organization reports direct public support 
and zero fundraising expenses; CompRate = The percentage of officer 
compensation allocated to programs; WageRate '"' The percentage 
employee wages (other than officers) allocated to programs; 
BenefitsRate = the percentage of employee benefits allocated to 
programs; JointRate = the percentage of total joint costs allocated to 
programs. 
CONCLUSION 
Prior research has shown that many donors utilize ratings for 
decisions (Tinkelman, 1.998; Sloan, 2009; Gordon et aI., 2009). What 
is not clear is whether charitable organizations manage their 
numbers to achieve a higher rating. The findings from this study 
indicate that highly rated organizations likely overstate their 
performance compared to their lower rated peers. Highly rated 
organizations appear to be exercising accounting discretion to 
I 
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increase their program expenses and decrease their fundraising 
expenses. Stakeholders relying on the rating systems should consider 
this possibility and consider additional data (such as nonfinancial 
information) before making definitive conclusions about the 
performance of a highly rated nonprofit organization. Prior research 
shows that after the passage of the. AICPA's SOP 98-2, some 
non profits stopped allocating joint costs and those that continued to 
report joint costs allocated less to programs (Roberts, 2005). 
Because reported high performance can be achieved by using 
discretion in allocating expenses to the program expense category, it 
would be beneficial if accounting regulators and/or the IRS provided 
more guidance on the allocation of expenses shared by program, 
fundraising, and administrative activities. Given nonprofit boards' 
financial oversight duty, the IRS suggests that boards review Form 
990s before they are filed (Kehrer & Matthews, 2009). Consistent 
with the IRS' point of view, our findings suggest boards exercise due 
diligence in assessing the reasonableness of the expense allocation 
and whether the allocations are consistent over time. 
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NOTES 
1.. This information is obtained from the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) website. See the IRS Statistics of Income (SOl) Bulletin: Fall 
2002 (http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/99eochar.pdf) and the SOl 
Bulletin: Fall 201.1. (www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11eofallbulteorg.pdf) 
for more details. 
2. On September 20, 201.1., Charity Navigator launched a new rating 
system, which adds accountability and transparency indicators to 
the original seven financial performance measures. 
3. Yetman and Yetman (2012) include industry indicator variables in 
their fundraising expense and administrative expense models. 
The model by Trussel (2003) also has charity type indicators. 
Even though our observations are all human service 
organizations, Charity Navigator further classifies them into six 
groups based on 1) the activity code each organization selects in 
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its fillings with the IRS, 2) the description of the organization's 
programs and services, and 3) how the organization functions 
financially (www.charitynavigator.orglindex.cfm?bay= . content. 
view&cpid= 34). The group classification reflects the rating 
agency's industry knowledge. 
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